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Abstract
A scheme for pseudo-random binary sequence generation based on the
two-dimensional discrete-time He´non map is proposed. Properties of the
proposed sequences pertaining to linear complexity, linear complexity pro-
file, correlation and auto-correlation are investigated. All these properties
of the sequences suggest a strong resemblance to random sequences. Re-
sults of statistical testing of the sequences are found encouraging. An
attempt is made to estimate the keyspace size if the proposed scheme is
used for cryptographic applications. The keyspace size is found to be large
and is dependent on the precision of the computing platform used.
Keywords: Chaos, nonlinear difference equations, random number gen-
eration, stream ciphers, cryptography.
1 Introduction
Pseudo-random number sequences are useful in many applications including
monte-carlo simulation, spread spectrum communications, steganography and
cryptography. Conventionally, pseudo-random sequence generators based on lin-
ear congruential methods and feedback shift-registers are popular [Knuth 1998].
For cryptographic applications, several algorithms such as ANSI X9.17 and FIPS
186 are found to be popular [Menezes et al 1997]. In recent times, several re-
searchers have been exploring the idea of using chaotic dynamical systems for
this purpose [Falcioni et al 2006, Kocarev 2001, Woodcock & Smart 1998]. The
random-like, unpredictable dynamics of chaotic systems, their inherent deter-
minism and simplicity of realization suggests their potential for exploitation as
pseudo-random number generators.
Cryptographic schemes based on chaos have been classified as 1) discrete-
time discrete-value schemes 2) discrete-time continuous-value schemes and 3)
continuous-time continuous-value schemes [Dachselt & Schwarz 2001]. All con-
ventional cryptographic schemes act on discrete symbols such as bits, integers,
characters and symbols and can be grouped into the first category, that of
discrete-time discrete-value schemes. In this paper, a scheme for obtaining a
pseudo-random binary sequence from the two-dimensional chaotic He´non map
is explored. Needless to say, since the sequence is a discrete-time discrete-value
signal, any cryptographic application of the same can be grouped under the first
of the three classes mentioned above.
2 The He´non Map
An N -dimensional discrete-time dynamical system is an iterative map f : ℜN →
ℜN of the form
Xk+1 = f (Xk) , (1)
where k = 0, 1, . . . is the discrete time and X ∈ ℜN is the state. Start-
ing from X0, the initial state, repeated iteration of (1) gives rise to a se-
ries of states known as an orbit. An example is the He´non map, a two-
dimensional discrete-time nonlinear dynamical system represented by the state
equations [He´non 1976, Alligood et al 1997, Peitgen et al 2004, Kumar 1996,
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Crutchfield et al 1986, Gleick 1997]
xk+1 = −αx2k + yk + 1 ,
yk+1 = βxk .
(2)
Here, (x, y) is the two-dimensional state of the system. The state-plane diagram
for α = 1.4 and β = 0.3 for this map is shown in Fig. 1. The diagram is a
strange attractor popularly known as the He´non attractor.
In this paper, the He´non map shall be considered a representative example
of 2-dimensional chaotic maps for the generation of pseudorandom sequences.
Figure 1: The Strange Attractor of He´non
3 Pseudorandom Sequence Generation Scheme
Generating a pseudorandom binary sequence from the orbit of a chaotic map
essentially requires mapping the state of the system to {0, 1}. For the He´non
map, consider the two bits bx and by derived respectively from the x and y
state-variables as follows:
bx =
{
1 if x > τx ;
0 if x ≤ τx . (3)
by =
{
1 if y > τy ;
0 if y ≤ τy . (4)
Here, τx and τy are appropriately chosen threshold values for state-variables x
and y. τx should be chosen such that the likelihood of x > τx is equal to that
of x ≤ τx. The median of a large set of numbers has precisely this property.
Therefore, we choose τx as the median of a large number (T ) of consecutive
values of x. Similarly, we assign to τy, the value of the median of T consecutive
values of y. Thus, two streams of bits Sx =
{
bix
}∞
i=1
and Sy =
{
biy
}∞
i=1
are
obtained from the map. Consider the bit-stream Bx formed by choosing every
P th bit of Sx, i.e., Bx =
{
bPix
}∞
i=1
. Consider the similarly formed bit-stream
By =
{
bPiy
}∞
i=1
. Let us denote the jth bit of these two sequences respectively
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as Bx (j) and By (j). Then, the pseudo-random output bit O is chosen as per
the following rule:
O (j) =


Bx (j) if By (j − 2) = 0 and By (j − 1) = 0 ;
Bx (j) if By (j − 2) = 0 and By (j − 1) = 1 ;
By (j) if By (j − 2) = 1 and By (j − 1) = 0 ;
By (j) if By (j − 2) = 1 and By (j − 1) = 1 .
(5)
Here, Bx and By respectively denote the logical inverse of Bx and By. For
j = 0, By (−2) and By (−1) can arbitrarily be assumed to be 0.
The author has found that generated pseudorandom sequences have good
statistical properties when P is large. The author has used P between 75 and
5000 depending on the available time for computation and the length of the
sequence required. In this paper, sequences generated using this method are
called He´non map sequences.
4 Linear Complexity Properties
A Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) is said to generate an N -bit sequence
W if for some initial state, the first N bits of the output sequence of the LFSR
are the same as W [Golomb 1964, Golomb 1982]. The length of the shortest
LFSR that generates W is known as its Linear Complexity.
The author has measured the linear complexity of a large number of even-
length He´non map sequences using the Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm (BMA)
[Massey 1969]. The linear complexities obtained for each sequence-length were
found to follow a certain probabilistic pattern. In particular, the probability of
the linear complexity C of an N -bit sequence being equal to c (c < N), when N
is even, was found to be very close to
P (C = c) =
{
(0.5)N−2c+1 if c ≤ N/2 ;
(0.5)
2c−N
if c > N/2 .
(6)
To illustrate the correctness of this conjecture, the experimentally deter-
mined distribution of linear complexities for 64-bit He´non map sequences is
shown in figure 2 a) alongside the conjectured distribution in figure 2 b) that
has been computed using (6). The mean value of linear complexities obtained in
this experiment was found to be 32.2083. The expectation of linear complexity
for a 64-bit random sequence is 32.2222 and is found to be very close to that
of the He´non map sequences [Menezes et al 1997]. The variance of linear com-
plexities of 64-bit sequences obtained by experiment was 1.0811 against 1.0617
for random sequences.
Similarly, the probability of the linear complexity C assuming the value
c (c < N) when N is odd was found to be very close to
P (C = c) =
{
(0.5)N−2c+1 if c < (N + 1) /2 ;
(0.5)
2c−N
if c ≥ (N + 1) /2 . (7)
Again, in fig. 3 a), the experimental distribution is shown along with the
experimentally determined distribution in fig. 3 b) for 65-bit He´non map se-
quences. The experimentally measured mean of linear complexities of these se-
quences was 32.7663 against the expected 32.7778 for random sequences. Also,
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a) experimental b) as per (6)
Figure 2: Probability Distribution of Linear Complexity: 64-bit sequences
the measured variance of linear complexities stands at 1.1177 against 1.0617 for
random sequences [Menezes et al 1997].
a) experimental b) as per (7)
Figure 3: Probability Distribution of Linear Complexity: 65-bit sequences
Let W be an N -bit binary sequence. Let Wi (i = 1, 2, . . . , N) denote the
subsequence of W consisting of its first i bits. Let Ci denote the linear com-
plexity of Wi. Then the sequence of linear complexities (C1, C2, C3, . . . , CN ) is
known as the linear complexity profile of W . For random sequences, the linear
complexity profile is expected to be very close to the Ci = i/2 line (Menezes et
al 1997). The linear complexity profile of a sample 553-bit sequence was deter-
mined using the Berlekamp-Massey Algorithm. The obtained profile is shown
in fig. 4 and can be seen to be very close to the Ci = i/2 line.
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Figure 4: Linear Complexity Profile
5 Correlation Properties
Consider two N -bit binary sequences U and V . Let A be the number of bit-by-
bit agreements between the two. The number of bit-by-bit disagreements must
be D = (N −A). Then the correlation θ of the two sequences is defined as
θ (U, V ) = (A−D) /N . (8)
Theorem 1 If U and V are two N -bit random binary sequences, the probability
of their correlation θ assuming the value Θ is given by
P (θ = Θ) =
√
2
Nπ
e−NΘ
2/2 (9)
when
Θ ∈
{ {
0,± 2N ,± 4N , . . . ,±1
}
for even N,{± 1N ,± 3N ,± 5N , . . . ,±1} for odd N.
The probability is zero for other values of Θ.
Proof: Since the probability of occurrence of a one is the same as the probability
of occurrence of a zero in a truly random sequence, the probability of occurrence
of an agreement (p = 0.5) is the same as the probability of occurrence of a
disagreement (1− p = 0.5) in a pair of such sequences. Therefore, the number
of agreements A in a pair of such sequences is a random variable that follows the
binomial distribution with mean µ = N/2 and standard deviation σ =
√
N/2.
Therefore
P (A = r) =
NCr
2N
. (10)
Applying the Normal approximation to the binomial distribution [Keeping 1962,
Ramasubramanian 1997],
P (A = r) ≈
√
2
Nπ
e−2(r−N/2)
2/N . (11)
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The correlation θ is related to the number of agreements A as
θ =
2A
N
− 1. (12)
As A ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . , N}, θ ∈ {−1, ( 2N − 1) , ( 4N − 1) , . . . , 1}. Therefore, θ ∈{
0,± 2N ,± 4N , . . . ,±1
}
for even N and θ ∈ {± 1N ,± 3N ,± 5N , . . . ,±1} for odd N .
Clearly, the probability of θ assuming any other value is zero. By (11) and (12),
if Θ belongs to the above set of valid values,
P (θ = Θ) =
√
2
Nπ
e−NΘ
2/2 (13)
which completes the proof.
The correlation between pairs of He´non map sequences was experimentally
determined and the probability distribution was found to be very close to that
of (9). As an illustration, the probability distribution for 127-bit He´non map
sequences and the expected distribution for random sequences are shown in Fig.
5.
Figure 5: Probability Distribution of Correlation. The legend Random is used
for a plot of (9)
The correlation of a sequence with a cyclic-shift of itself is known as its cyclic
auto-correlation. LetW be anN -bit sequence andW j denoteW cyclically right-
shifted by j bits. Then the cyclic auto-correlation function of W is defined as
R (j) = θ
(
W,W j
)
. The (cyclic) auto-correlation function of a random sequence
is expected to be unity at j = 0 and close to zero at all other values of j. This
indeed was found to be the case with He´non map sequnces. The auto-correlation
function of a 2000-bit He´non map sequence is shown in fig. 6. In the figure,
a negative value of shift signifies cyclic left-shifting by an amount equal to the
magnitude.
6
Figure 6: Auto-Correlation Function
6 Statistical Testing
A number of sequences were generated by the algorithm and were subjected
to statistical tests. The tests carried out were Menezes et al’s basic tests of
randomness [Menezes et al 1997], FIPS 140-1 [FIPS PUB 140-1] recommended
battery of tests and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
battery of tests [Rukhin et al 2001].
Menezes et al have proposed a set of five basic tests consisting of frequency
test, serial test, poker test, runs test and auto-correlation test. While the first
four tests were carried out once for a given sequence, the auto-correlation test
was carried out for all possible shifted-versions of the sequence. The result of
each test is a test statistic which is compared with a threshold value (one-sided
test). The test results in a failure if the threshold is exceeded. The tests were
carried out at a significance level of 0.01, hence 1% of failures were expected
even for random sequences.
FIPS 140-1 recommends a set of statistical tests for cryptographic random/
pseudorandom number generators. The tests are carried out on a bit-stream
of 20,000 bits. The recommended tests are monobit, poker, runs and long-run
tests. Each test is a two-sided test where a test-statistic is required to lie within
an interval. Though FIPS 140-1 has subsequently been superceded by FIPS
140-2 [FIPS PUB 140-2], since the latter standard does not recommend any
statistical tests for cryptographic random/ pseudorandom number generators,
the author has used the older recommendations of FIPS 140-1 to evaluate He´non
map sequences.
NIST has forumulated a statistical test suite for random/ pseudo-random
number generators to be used for cryptographic applications. The suite consists
of a battery of sixteen tests namely 1) Frequency (monobit) test, 2) Frequency
test within a block, 3) Runs test, 4) Test for longest run of ones in a block, 5)
Binary matrix rank test, 6) Discrete Fourier Transform (spectral) test, 7) Non-
overlapping template matching test, 8) Overlapping template matching test, 9)
Maurer’s universal statistical test, 10) Lempel-Ziv compression test, 11) Linear
complexity test, 12) Serial test, 13) Approximate entropy test, 14) Cumulative
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sums test, 15) Random excursions test and 16) Random excursions variant test.
7 Statistical Test Results
7.1 Menezes et al’s basic tests of randomness
Two 128-bit sequences R1 and R2 were generated using parameters shown in
table 1. The notation used for test-statistics is the same as those in (Menezes
et al 1997). The statistic X5 of the auto-correlation test is a function of the
value of the relative circular shift. In this case, the value of the relative circular
shift is shown in brackets. For example, the statistic obtained by running the
auto-correlation test on the sequence and its 3-shifted version is denoted by
X5 (3). A similar notation is used for the statistic X3 of the poker test where
X3 depends on the length of the non-overlapping sub-sequences. The results of
the tests on the sequences are shown in table 2.
Parameter R1 R2
α 1.40 1.20
β 0.30 0.30
x0 -0.75 -0.75
y0 -0.02 0.32
By (−2) 0 0
By (−1) 1 1
P 24 24
T 1000 1000
Table 1: Parameters used for Menezes’ test samples
7.2 FIPS 140-1
Testing for compliance with FIPS 140-1 is required to be carried out with se-
quences of 20,000 bits. Five sequences S1 through S5 were generated using
parameters shown in table 3. The results of the tests on the sequences are
shown in table 4.
7.3 NIST Statistical Test Suite
For each test-run of the test-suite, a sequence of 2 × 108 bits was generated
and the test-suite was configured to consider this sequence as 200 sequences of
1× 106 bits each. This set of 200 sequences was subjected to statistical testing
in each case. In this manner, the distribution of failures could also be examined
by the test-suite and appropriate analysis could be carried out.
The test was carried out on two sets U1 and U2 of 200-samples each. The
parameters used for generating these sets of sequences are shown in table 5.
For a sample of 200 sequences, the minimum proportion of sequences required
to pass all the tests of the suite other than the random excursions (variant)
test is 0.968893. The proportion of sequences passing these tests was found to
be larger than this threshold. For the random excursions (variant) test, the
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Statistic Expected R1 Result (R1) R2 Result (R2)
X1 < 6.634897 0.125000 Pass 6.125000 Pass
X2 < 9.210340 0.213583 Pass 6.245079 Pass
X3 (2) < 11.344867 4.625000 Pass 7.625000 Pass
X3 (3) < 18.475307 1.809524 Pass 9.428571 Pass
X4 < 9.210340 0.890713 Pass 5.373956 Pass
X5 (1) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.443678 Pass -0.088736 Pass
X5 (2) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.178174 Pass 1.069045 Pass
X5 (3) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.268328 Pass -0.98387 Pass
X5 (4) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.257237 Pass -0.179605 Pass
X5 (5) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.631169 Pass -0.811503 Pass
X5 (6) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0 Pass -0.724286 Pass
X5 (7) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.272727 Pass 0.272727 Pass
X5 (8) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.730297 Pass -0.912871 Pass
X5 (9) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.09167 Pass 0.09167 Pass
X5 (10) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.288804 Pass 0 Pass
X5 (11) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.09245 Pass -0.64715 Pass
X5 (12) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0 Pass 0 Pass
X5 (13) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.466252 Pass -0.466252 Pass
X5 (14) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.749269 Pass -0.561951 Pass
X5 (15) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.658505 Pass -0.282216 Pass
X5 (16) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.188982 Pass -0.377964 Pass
X5 (17) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.233905 Pass -1.993232 Pass
X5 (18) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.381385 Pass -2.097618 Pass
X5 (19) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.287348 Pass -0.478913 Pass
X5 (20) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.539601 Pass -0.96225 Pass
X5 (21) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.06341 Pass -0.290021 Pass
X5 (22) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.194257 Pass -1.748315 Pass
X5 (23) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.85421 Pass -2.04939 Pass
X5 (24) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.784465 Pass 0.392232 Pass
X5 (25) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.280928 Pass 0.68973 Pass
X5 (26) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.782266 Pass -0.594089 Pass
X5 (27) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.298511 Pass -0.298511 Pass
X5 (28) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.4 Pass -1.8 Pass
X5 (29) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.306549 Pass 1.105542 Pass
X5 (30) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.808122 Pass 0.606092 Pass
X5 (31) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.929158 Pass -0.507673 Pass
X5 (32) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0 Pass -0.408248 Pass
X5 (33) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.102598 Pass 0.307794 Pass
X5 (34) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0 Pass -0.206284 Pass
X5 (35) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.933257 Pass -2.384989 Fail
X5 (36) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.625543 Pass -0.208514 Pass
X5 (37) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.314485 Pass -0.943456 Pass
X5 (38) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.843274 Pass -1.897367 Pass
X5 (39) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.317999 Pass -0.317999 Pass
X5 (40) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.918806 Pass -0.639602 Pass
X5 (41) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.393746 Pass -0.964901 Pass
X5 (42) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.862662 Pass 0.215666 Pass
X5 (43) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.325396 Pass -0.325396 Pass
X5 (44) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.309307 Pass -0.872872 Pass
X5 (45) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.426935 Pass -1.426935 Pass
X5 (46) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.441726 Pass -0.220863 Pass
X5 (47) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1 Pass 0.777778 Pass
X5 (48) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.67082 Pass -0.447214 Pass
X5 (49) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.237597 Pass -1.012579 Pass
X5 (50) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.452911 Pass 0.679366 Pass
X5 (51) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.025645 Pass 0.797724 Pass
X5 (52) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.458831 Pass 0.458831 Pass
X5 (53) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.11547 Pass -0.57735 Pass
X5 (54) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.464991 Pass -1.394972 Pass
X5 (55) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.819288 Pass -0.117041 Pass
X5 (56) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.235702 Pass -0.471405 Pass
X5 (57) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.780172 Pass 0.593391 Pass
X5 (58) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.717137 Pass 0.239046 Pass
X5 (59) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -1.324244 Pass -1.083473 Pass
X5 (60) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.242536 Pass 0.242536 Pass
X5 (61) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 1.588203 Pass -0.855186 Pass
X5 (62) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.246183 Pass -1.723281 Pass
X5 (63) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 0.620174 Pass 0.124035 Pass
X5 (64) |X5 (·)| < 2.326348 -0.5 Pass 0.5 Pass
Table 2: Testing for Menezes’ Basic Tests of Randomness
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Parameter S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
α 1.23 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.41
β 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30 0.21
x0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0 -1.0
y0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
By (−2) 0 0 0 0 0
By (−1) 1 1 1 1 1
P 84 84 84 24 24
T 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
Table 3: Parameters used for FIPS 140-1 test samples
Statistic Expected S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
n1 9654 < n1 < 10346 9938 10107 9944 10099 10020
X3 1.03 < X3 < 57.40 17.25 13.03 12.98 14.73 6.66
B1 2267 < B1 < 2733 2572 2473 2560 2480 2454
G1 2267 < G1 < 2733 2452 2524 2534 2554 2447
B2 1079 < B2 < 1421 1192 1231 1200 1286 1268
G2 1079 < G2 < 1421 1302 1264 1226 1262 1310
B3 502 < B3 < 748 640 643 653 636 616
G3 502 < G3 < 748 611 577 638 582 580
B4 223 < B4 < 402 277 319 320 312 312
G4 223 < G4 < 402 328 315 306 336 314
B5 90 < B5 < 223 140 165 162 150 156
G5 90 < G5 < 223 156 165 168 148 159
B6 90 < B6 < 223 180 159 134 159 164
G6 90 < G6 < 223 151 146 157 142 159
Result Pass/Fail Pass Pass Pass Pass Pass
Table 4: Testing for FIPS 140-1
required minimum passing proportion was found to be 0.961540 and 0.962864
for U1 and U2 respectively. U1 and U2 were found to meet this requirement also.
The author has noticed, however, that some of the sequences that pass the FIPS
140-1 and Menezes’ tests do not pass the NIST suite of tests. For example, a
set of sequences generated using the same parameters as R1 was found to fail
in the NIST suite. The author has found that passing the NIST suite requires
a more careful choice of the parameters. In this case, increasing the value of T
to a sufficiently large value resulted in the sequences passing the NIST suite.
8 Keyspace Size
The properties of He´non map sequences presented in the preceding sections
demonstrate that they are potential candidates for cryptographic applications.
A He´non map sequence can be used, for example, can be directly Exclusive-
ORed, bit-by-bit, with a data sequence of the same length. Such a cipher is
popularly known as the Vernam Cipher [Kippenhahn 1999, Mollin 2001]. The
10
Parameter U1 U2
α 1.40 1.398
β 0.30 0.283
x0 -1 0.26
y0 1 0.29
By (−2) 0 0
By (−1) 1 1
P 117 111
T 1000 1000
Table 5: Parameters used for NIST test samples
values of α, β, x0, y0 and the sampling-factor P together can form the key. In
this section, an attempt is made to estimate the size of the keyspace for such a
cipher.
The author has found that α in (1.16, 1.41) and β in (0.2, 0.3) are useful
for generating sequences with the desired statistical properties. Also, we can
assume x0 to lie in (−1, 1) and y0 to lie in (−0.35, 0.35). P can be assumed
within (80, 1000). Though these limits are in no way binding or accurate, they
should give a reasonable estimate of the size of the keyspace. The size of the
keyspace then depends on the precision of the computing platform on which
the cipher algorithm is implemented. With 32-bit floating-point numbers of
the IEEE format, the smallest possible increment (ǫ) is ǫ32 ≈ 1.1921 × 10−7.
With 64-bit floating-point numbers this value is ǫ64 ≈ 2.2204 × 10−16. Let αˆ
indicate the size of the interval over which α can span i.e. αˆ = 1.41− 1.16. Let
βˆ, xˆ0, yˆ0 and Pˆ have correspondingly similar meaning. Since P is an integer,
Pˆ = 1000−80. Then, the number of representable values of α on the applicable
computing platform can be computed as Kα = αˆ/ǫ. Such a calculation can
easily be carried out using logarithms. Similarly, Kβ,Kx0 and Ky0 can also be
calculated. KP = Pˆ . Since the parameters are used together, the size of the
keyspace K = Kα×Kβ ×Kx0 ×Ky0 ×KP . The logarithm of this figure, to the
base 2, gives an estimate of the length of a single binary key which contains all
the information required to generate the pseudo-random sequence. The value of
log2 (K) for 32-bit and 64-bit precision was found to be 97 and 213 respectively.
The size of the keyspace can be further increased by increasing the precision of
floating-point representation.
9 Concluding Remarks
Though chaotic orbits of discrete-time maps are non-periodic in nature, because
of finite precision of digital computers the orbits actually turn out to be periodic.
The average period of an orbit of a two-dimensional map can be expected to
be longer than that of a one-dimensional map. To overcome the inevitable
periodicity in digital computation, Shujun et al have used simple LFSR-based
perturbation generators to perturb the parameters of the dynamical systems
used [Shujun et al 2001]. Though they have used perturbed one-dimensional
maps in couple-chaotic-system-based pseudorandom sequence generators, the
same technique should be directly applicable to the present algorithm and is a
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feasible way of defeating the periodicity.
The periodicity inherent in digital-computer implementations is not a prob-
lem in maps realized on an analog-computer. The He´non map, due to its poly-
nomial form, can be realized in the form of an electronic circuit using analog-
multipliers, sample-and-hold blocks and operational amplifiers. Such a realiza-
tion of the logistic map has already been studied [Suneel 2006]. The advantage
of an analog realization of chaotic maps is that due to natural variations in
circuit parameters and conditions, practically identical systems provided with
practically identical conditions generate sequences that quickly diverge and be-
come un-correlated within a short time. Therefore, such implementations may
actually turn out to be truly random (as opposed to pseudorandom) sequence
generators.
The choice of the He´non map for the work in this paper was rather arbitrary.
The author believes that similar results should also be attainable with other
two-dimensional maps.
The linear complexity and correlation properties of the proposed sequences
suggest a strong similarity to random sequences. Results of statistical tests
carried out confirm this further. A large size of the keyspace suggests strong
candidature for cryptographic applications, especially for stream cipher cryptog-
raphy. Possible cryptanalysis techniques for these sequences is an open subject.
10 Acknowledgements
The author thanks his colleagues A.P. Dabhade, K.V. Suresh, D. Venu Gopal
and R.S. Chandrasekhar for several hours of discussions.
References
[Crutchfield et al 1986] Crutchfield J P, Farmer J D, Packard N H, Shaw R S
1986 Chaos, Sci. Amer. 255:38-49
[Dachselt & Schwarz 2001] Dachselt F, Schwarz W 2001 Chaos and Cryptogra-
phy, IEEE Trans. Circ. Sys. - I 48:1498-1509
[Falcioni et al 2006] Falcioni M, Palatella L, Pigolotti S, Vulpiani A 2006 Prop-
erties Making a Chaotic System a Good Pseudo Random Number Gener-
ator, ePrint arXiv:nlin.CD/0503035
[FIPS PUB 140-1] FIPS PUB 140-1, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, 11 January 1994
[FIPS PUB 140-2] FIPS PUB 140-2, Federal Information Processing Standards
Publication - Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, 25 May 2001
[Gleick 1997] Gleick J 1997 Chaos, (London: Vintage)
[Golomb 1964] Golomb S W 1964 Introduction to Digital Communication in
Golomb S W [ed] Digital Communications with Space Applications, (En-
glewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall) pp 1-16
12
[Golomb 1982] Golomb S W 1982 Shift Register Sequences, (Laguna Hills:
Aegean Park Press) pp 1-108
[He´non 1976] He´non M 1976 A Two-dimensional Mapping with a Strange At-
tractor, Commun. Math. Phys. 50:6977
[Alligood et al 1997] Alligood K T, Sauer T D, Yorke J A 1997 Chaos - An
Introduction to Dynamical Systems (New York: Springer-Verlag) pp 43-91,
163-166, 238-239
[Keeping 1962] Keeping E S 1962 Introduction to Statistical Inference (Prince-
ton: D. Van ostrand) pp 64-66
[Kippenhahn 1999] Kippenhahn R 1999 Code Breaking: A History and Explo-
ration (Hyderabad: Universities Press) pp 201-204
[Knuth 1998] Knuth D E 1998 The Art of Computer Programming, Volume
2/Seminumerical Algorithms, 3rd ed (Reading: Addison Wesley) pp 9-37
[Kocarev 2001] Kocarev L 2001 Chaos-Based Cryptography: A Brief Overview,
IEEE Circ. & Sys. Mag., 1:6-21
[Kumar 1996] Kumar N 1996 Deterministic Chaos: Complex Chance out of
Simple Necessity, (Hyderabad: Universities Press)
[Massey 1969] Massey J L 1969 Shift Register Synthesis and BCH Decoding,
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 15:122-127
[Menezes et al 1997] Menezes A J, van Oorschot P C, Vanstone S A 1997 Hand-
book of Applied Cryptography (Boca Raton: CRC Press) pp 198-200
[Mollin 2001] Mollin R A 2001 An Introduction to Cryptography, (Boca Raton:
Chapman and Hall/CRC), pp 115-116
[Peitgen et al 2004] Peitgen H O, Ju¨rgens H, Saupe D 2004 Chaos and Fractals,
New Frontiers of Science, 2nd ed (New York: Springer-Verlag) pp 609-627
[Ramasubramanian 1997] Ramasubramanian S 1997 The Normal Distribution:
From Binomial to Normal, Resonance 2:15-24
[Rukhin et al 2001] Rukhin A et al 2001 NIST Special Publication 800-22: A
Statistical Test Suite for Random and Pseudorandom Number Generators
for Cryptographic Applications, National Institute of Standards and Tech-
nology.
[Shujun et al 2001] Shujun L, Xuanqin M, Yuanlong C 2001 Pseudorandom Bit
Generator Based on Couple Chaotic Systems and its Applications in Stream
Cipher Cryptography, Progress in Cryptology: INDOCRYPT-2001 The 2nd
International Conference on Cryptology in India, Indian Institute of Tech-
nology, Madras, Chennai, India, 16-20 December 2001.
[Suneel 2006] Suneel M 2006 Electronic Circuit Realization of the Logistic Map,
Sa¯dhana¯, 31(1):69-78
[Woodcock & Smart 1998] Woodcock C F, Smart N P 1998 p-adic Chaos and
Random Number Generation, Experimental Math., 7:333-342.
13
